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Abstract 
 
We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. 
We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their 
income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the 
resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is 
relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the 
alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key 
factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies the political acceptability of a road pricing policy in a context 
characterized by heterogeneous agents choosing between two distinct congestible 
infrastructures producing differentiated transport services. One service is fast and 
expensive (e.g., auto) while the other slow and not expensive (e.g., public transport). By 
assumption, public transport is slower than private transport, regardless of the modal 
split. The heterogeneity of agents is accounted for by assuming the existence of three 
groups. People are homogeneous within each group and the three groups differ for the 
level of income of the agents. For this reason, we call these groups rich, middle class 
and poor. No one group has the absolute majority of votes which, therefore, requires the 
combination of any pair of groups. At the same time, we assume that initially (i.e. at the 
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status quo) both modes of transport are always used by at least by one income group. 
For the political competition, we use a citizen-candidate framework (see Osborne and 
Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) in which there is neither uncertainty nor 
commitment. This in turn means that the elected candidate implements its preferred 
policy.  
The model assumes that a road pricing can be imposed on the private mode of 
transport by any elected citizen-candidate with or without redistribution in favor of the 
public transport mode. Redistribution of revenues to car drivers is ruled out. Under 
these assumptions, the model provides the following results. Road pricing policies on 
the private mode are never imposed when there is no redistribution of raised revenues 
towards the public mode of transport. When such redistribution is made, it is possible to 
obtain equilibria with the adoption of road pricing schemes. In particular, this is the case 
when the congestion of the alternative mode of transport is relatively low or when the 
resources from road pricing allow to improve substantially the quality of the alternative 
mode of transport. Finally, the acceptability of road pricing policies appears to be high 
when a large fraction of the population does not use road transport in the status quo. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. Section 3 
defines the basic setup of the problem. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium of the 
model when there is no redistribution of the road pricing revenues while Section 5 
determines the properties of the equilibrium when such redistribution (in favor of public 
transport) is allowed. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
This paper combines a recent stream of literature on integrated urban road pricing 
policies (see, for instance, Glazer and Niskanen, 2000 and Armelius, 2005) with a rather 
standard version of a citizen-candidate game (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and 
Coate, 1997). The novelty of this approach relates to the analysis of the interaction 
between the level of the tariff proposed, the eligibility of the candidate proposing it and 
its political acceptability, given the income distribution and the modes of transport used 
by the community. 
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In order to locate our contribution, we can conveniently divide the literature on road 
pricing in three different streams, as suggested in a recent book by Arnott, Rave and 
Schöb (2005). In the first stream of literature, urban congestion pricing theory was 
developed in a first-best transport and capacity perspective. A second stream has began 
with the literature on second-best pricing and capacity with the aim of making 
congestion pricing more politically acceptable. Finally a third one, characterized by a 
more applied attitude, examines in detail all the relevant aspects at a micro level that can 
foster or hinder the adoption of a pricing scheme. Given the above framework of 
references on road pricing, one might locate this paper in an embryonic part of the third 
phase of Arnott's et al. schematization of road pricing literature. In fact, even if, among 
other weaknesses, the setup proposed is very aggregated with respect to agents 
heterogeneity (a much more advanced work, under this respect, is de Palma and 
Lindsey, 2004) and the analytical treatment of the two transport modes (private and 
public) is rather rough, nonetheless, the paper attempts to provide some new insights 
concerning the political acceptability of road pricing policies. Previous research has 
looked into the issue of political acceptability enquiring various issues such as those 
reported below, but has never interpreted the problem in a citizen-candidate framework. 
The politico-economic and fairness considerations of adopting road pricing have 
recently been addressed in a paper by Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann (2002) 
where the lack of citizens' support for road pricing initiatives is attributed to two factors 
which are the general lack of will to adopt the price system as an allocation mechanism 
for scarce resources (Hahn, 1989; Frey et al., 1985) and the difficulty with which the 
latent support for road pricing schemes translates into actual policy making (Small, 
1992). This way of explaining the low practical implementation of road pricing dwells 
on research interpreting the scarce adoption of road pricing schemes as due to its low 
political acceptability (see reviews by Jones, 1995; Schlag and Teubel, 1997). 
Individuals might not accept road pricing due to a misperception of the negative effects 
as being caused by others rather than by oneself (Sheldon et al., 1993) thus contributing 
to a feeling of unfairness either perceived or real (Emmerink et al., 1995). Research by 
Baron and Jurney (1993) and Baron (1995) has shown that people are opposed to 
coerced reforms even though they sympathize with the intended purpose. The most 
important reasons for opposing road pricing have been attributed to social or moral 
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norms of fairness and freedom of choice. These considerations had already been raised 
by Borins as late as 1988 (Borins, 1988). Other issues concerning the acceptability of 
road pricing policies that have progressively received greater attention have to do with 
misunderstanding, complexity, equity/fairness, privacy issues or tax resistance 
(Giuliano, 1994; Goodwin, 1989; Jones, 1998; May, 1992) as well as individual specific 
uncertainty (Marcucci and Marini, 2003). 
Implementation hinges on a political question: will it be politically feasible to impose 
a road pricing scheme? As it is now strongly remarked in the current literature, this 
question can hardly be answered in abstract and general terms (Santos and Fraser, 
2005). 
 
3. Setup 
 
We consider a population living in a given area composed of three homogeneous 
groups { } 1,2,3k kG =  only differing in their income level. We denote by ky  the income 
level of every agent belonging to a k-th income group. Hence, we assume that 
1 2 3y y y> > , with i hk ky y=  for every { }, ki h G∈ 1. Every group has mass kµ , with 
1k kµ =∑  and 0.5kµ < . Therefore, it follows that 0.5g lµ µ+ >  for every { }, 1,2,3g l = . 
In other words, group 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the rich, the middle class and the poor 
respectively, and the absolute majority of votes requires the combination of any pair of 
groups. 
We also assume that each individual consumes one unit of transport. We denote with t 
the time spent for the journey and assume that this is positively related to the number (or 
mass) of agents [ ]0,1µ∈  using that mode of transport, i.e. 0dt
dµ > . Hence, we denote 
by ( ( ))k j jv t µ  the value of a journey made by an agent of group k when using a given   
j-th congestible mode of transport. The journey requires travel time jt  which depends 
positively on the mass jµ  of the people using the mode of transport j. The willingness 
to pay of the individuals is decreasing in the time spent for the journey and, therefore, 
                                                 
1 We make no restrictive hypotheses concerning the income differences between the three groups. 
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0kdv
dt
<  for every individual in kG . Moreover, due to the different income of the 
individuals of the three groups, we can simply assume that for every thj  mode of 
transport and for every level of congestion jµ :2  
 
(1) 1 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0j j j j j jv t v t v tµ µ µ> > ≥ . 
 
The optimization problem of an individual belonging to a given group k is:  
 
(2) max  ( ( ), ) max  ( ( ))k j j j k j j jj jt p v t pσ µ µ = −   
where ( ( ), )k j j jt pσ µ  denotes the net surplus of each consumer in group k using 
the thj  transport mode at its price jp . Thus, by choosing one unit of a given transport 
mode over a number of alternatives, all individuals aim at maximizing their own net 
surplus, equal to the difference between their willingness to pay for the time spent in the 
transport mode and its unitary price. To keep things simple, we suppose that in the area 
under consideration, only two substitute systems of transport exist for a given journey, a 
fast one (auto) j=f, and a slow one (public transport) j=s, with 0 f st t< <  and 
0f sp p> > . Therefore, at the optimal choice, every ki G∈  will select mode j if and 
only if:  
(3)    
( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
and ( ( ), ) 0
k j j j k h h h
k j j j
t p t p
t p
σ µ σ µ
σ µ
≥ ≥
 
for h j≠ . At the status quo, we expect that, when affordable, rich people ( )1i G∈  will 
always choose auto for any congestion level and poor people ( )3i G∈  public transport. 
Therefore: 
(4)    1 1
3 3
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ),
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ).
f f f s s s
f f f s s s
t p t p
t p t p
σ µ σ µ
σ µ σ µ
≥ ≤
 
                                                 
2 The intuition behind this assumption is that for any given time spent in transport, the higher income 
individuals have a higher willingness to pay for the trip which originates from the higher opportunity cost 
of time. 
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As far as the people of middle class are concerned ( )2i G∈ , two status quo are 
conceivable. In a first one, they all prefer to use auto, and this requires that, at the given 
prices fp  and sp :  
(5)    2 2
2
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ),
and ( ( ), ) 0.
f f f s s s
f f f
t p t p
t p
σ µ σ µ
σ µ
≥ ≥
 
In the second status quo, the sign of the first expression above is reversed, and 
initially the people of the middle class will, at the given prices, find optimal to select the 
private mode of transport. 
Using the setup described above, we now consider a simple citizen-candidate game in 
which a road pricing scheme on the auto (with a given distribution of the raised 
revenues) is decided by a leader elected directly by the people of the area through a 
majority voting process among the menu of citizen-candidates participating to the 
election. The menu of candidates is endogenous and one individual runs for office if and 
only if, in equilibrium, the net gain of doing so - the surplus he gets if he does run, plus 
an exogenous benefit b - exceeds a given cost c of running for office.3 We assume the 
absence of any form of commitment so that the elected candidate implements its 
preferred policy. We also assume that voting is sincere.4 
In order to determine the political outcome of the game, we first determine the 
preferred road pricing policy that a candidate of group kG  would select once elected. 
Then, we determine which agent will be elected and the policy implemented. We 
analyze two possible situations. The first is when the road pricing revenues are not 
redistributed, while in a second situation the revenues from road pricing are 
redistributed in favor of the public mode of transport. 
 
                                                 
3 The existence of an exogenous benefit b of winning the election and of a fixed cost c to run for it, with 
b>c, implies that no candidate will run for an election when there is no probability of winning. When this 
probability is positive, running for the election provides positive utility. 
4 This assumption can be justified by noting that each individual regards himself as an atomistic subject. 
Therefore, he considers his vote irrelevant in conditioning the outcome of the elections. Osborne and 
Slivinsky (1996) assume that voting is sincere while individuals are strategic in Besley and Coate (1997). 
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4. Road pricing in absence of redistribution 
 
We now consider the benchmark case in which none of the revenues raised by the 
road pricing are redistributed.5 We first analyze the case in which at the status quo all 
population of the middle class ( )2i G∈ initially uses the fast mode (i.e. the road). We 
denote by kτ?  the road pricing under no redistribution decided by a candidate belonging 
to a group kG  when elected. In what follows we illustrate in detail the level of road 
pricing set by the running candidate of each group under the no distribution scenario. 
The optimal policy of the rich 1( )i G∈ . A rich candidate would ideally tax positively 
the auto only if the gain in surplus obtained by excluding the middle class, and thus 
reducing congestion, exceeds the cost of being tolled. In this case, the tax 1τ?  will be just 
equal to the difference between the surplus of one middle class member when using the 
auto together with the rich class and the surplus obtained by using the public mode of 
transport with both the middle and the poor class.6  
Therefore, if 
 
(6)    1 1 1 1 2 1( ( )) ( ( )) 0f fv t v tµ µ µ τ− + − >?  
 
it follows that 
 
(7)    1 2 1 2 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0.f f s st p t pτ σ µ σ µ µ= − + >?  
If, on the other hand, there is no gain for the rich class individuals from the switch, i.e.  
 
(8)    1 1 1 1 2 1( ( )) ( ( )) 0f fv t v tµ µ µ τ− + − ≤?  
                                                 
5 Such an absence of redistribution can also represent the case in which the taxation system is so 
inefficient that no money is offered back in any form to the tax payers. 
6 Note that here the toll makes every middle class individual indifferent between auto and public transit, 
according to a standard Wardrop’s (1952) concept of equilibrium. In network analysis it has been 
standard to assume that (a) travellers behave selfishly, and (b) individual travellers are atomless, i.e. have 
zero mass or measure. Accordingly, the equilibrium can be conceived as a situation stable against 
individual deviations.  
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every rich candidate will optimally impose a zero road pricing ( 1 0τ =? ). 
The optimal policy of the middle class 2( )i G∈ . When there is no redistribution of the 
revenues, there is no reason for the agents of the middle class to impose a positive road 
pricing as they have already optimally chosen the use of the private mode of transport 
( 2 0τ =? ). 
The optimal policy of the poor 3( )i G∈ . It is clear that also for the poor there is no 
incentive to impose a positive road pricing given that they would obtain no advantage 
from it ( 3 0τ =? ). 
It is easy to see that, at the second status quo, in which initially all 2i G∈  use public 
transport, the proposed road pricing schemes is 1 2 3 0τ τ τ= = =? ? ? . 
The next proposition makes clear that, in absence of redistribution, the political 
equilibrium implies a zero road pricing scheme. 
 
Proposition 1. Under no redistribution of the road pricing revenues, the political 
equilibrium of the citizen-candidate game implies a zero road pricing scheme (i.e. 
0* =τ ) under both status quo considered. 
 
Proof. When the game starts with the first status quo ( 1 2fµ µ µ= +  and 3sµ µ= ) and 
there is no redistribution of the road pricing revenues, the proposed 1τ?  will either be 
positive or equal to zero (depending on the effect of congestion on rich class's surplus), 
while both middle and poor citizen-candidates will prefer to impose a zero road pricing, 
since, in absence of redistribution, they both lose from the switch of the middle class. 
So, for the case in which 1 0τ >? , no rich candidate will run for office as he would be 
defeated by a poor or middle class candidate. In equilibrium, a middle class or a poor 
candidate will run for office and win the elections. The choice on which of the two will 
run only depends on the relative weight of the mass 2µ  and 3µ : in fact, when the policy 
of different citizen candidates (belonging to different groups) coincides, the voters will 
always vote for their own candidate. In this case, whoever is the winner, the political 
equilibrium will always imply a zero road pricing 0* =τ . Similarly, when 1 0τ =? , the 
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only candidate running for the election will belong to the class with greater mass kµ , 
and will decide an equilibrium road pricing 0* =τ . Starting with the second status quo 
( 1fµ µ=  and 2 3sµ µ µ= + ), all citizen-candidates will propose 0kτ =? , so that the 
political equilibrium with a 0* =τ  will, again, be trivially satisfied. 
Although the above result is not surprising, it helps to understand the reasons why 
road pricing policies, without an appropriate scheme of redistribution of the revenues 
obtained towards public transport, is likely not to be implemented in modern cities. In 
fact, without an appropriate use of the funds raised, only rich citizens may (sometimes) 
gain from road pricing. This occurs when the gain from the reduced congestion more 
than offset the increased price of road transport. All other citizens have no interest, 
without redistribution, to impose a toll. This in turn implies that no road pricing is the 
preferred policy of the majority of the population and of the elected politicians. The 
following section shows that the result can be different when simple forms of 
redistribution of the resources obtained from road pricing are implemented. 
 
5. Road pricing in presence of redistribution 
 
We now briefly consider a framework where all revenues raised by a road pricing 
scheme are redistributed in favor of the public transport through a reduction of its price 
ps .7 At the status quo at which the middle class uses the auto ( 1 2fµ µ µ= +  and 
3sµ µ= ), a road pricing scheme on the auto decided by an elected candidate of group 
Gk , here denoted ˆkτ , will be as follows. 
The optimal policy of the rich 1( )i G∈ . Similarly to the previous section, every rich 
candidate ( 1i G∈ ) would ideally tax positively road users only when the gain from 
excluding the whole middle class from this mode of transport - in terms of reduced 
congestion - exceeds its increased price as due to such a pricing scheme. In this case, the 
                                                 
7 The effect on sp  is analogous (and provides a reduced form) to the redistribution of road pricing funds 
in favour of public transport, which can either reduce its price or increase its quality (in turn rising the 
willingness to pay of its users), hence increasing their surplus. 
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tax 1ˆτ  will be just equal to the difference between every middle class member's surplus 
from being in the private mode with the rich class and the surplus by being in the public 
mode with the poor and the middle class, at the reduced price 



+−= 132
11 τˆµµ
µ
ss pp , 
including the redistribution. Note that now such a marginal condition is more easily 
satisfied as before, because in this case the redistribution constitutes an extra incentive 
for the middle class to switch to the public mode of transport. Therefore, if 
 
(9)    1 1 1 1 2 1ˆ( ( )) ( ( )) 0f fv t v tµ µ µ τ ′− + − >  
    
 
then 
 
(10)    11 2 1 2 2 3ˆ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0,f f s st p t pτ σ µ σ µ µ′ = − + >  
 
where 



+−= 132
11 τˆµµ
µ
ss pp  denotes the reduced price of public transport after 
redistribution. However, if condition (9) is not satisfied, then the rich will find optimal 
to impose a zero road pricing, i.e. 1ˆ 0τ ′′ = . 
The optimal policy of the middle class 2( )i G∈ . A candidate of the middle class has 
no interest to impose a positive tax on the auto, except when a positive gain can be 
made tolling the rich class and joining the poor class in the use of public transport at the 
reduced price generated by the redistribution of resources. Therefore, if  
 
(11)   12 1 2 2 3 2
2 3
ˆ( ( )) ( ( )) ,f f s sv t p v t p
µµ µ µ τµ µ ′− < + − + +  
 
we have 
(12)   22 1 1 1 2 3ˆ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0,f f s st p t pτ σ µ σ µ µ′ = − + >  
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where 2 1 2
2 3
ˆs sp p
µ τµ µ
 ′= − + 
 denotes the price of public transport after redistribution. 
However, if condition (11) does not hold, the middle class candidate will impose a zero 
road pricing 2ˆ 0τ ′′ = . 
The optimal policy of the poor 3( )i G∈ . A poor citizen-candidate has two possible 
choices. The first is to impose a very high tax on the private mode of transport (call it 
3ˆτ ′ ) up to the point where only the rich class use the auto. This happens if the gain in 
surplus is so high to exceed the over-congestion in public transport determined by the 
switch of the middle class from the auto to public transport. Notice that in this case the 
optimal policy of the poor is exactly the same of the middle class (when the latter wants 
to impose a positive road pricing), i.e. 3 2ˆ ˆτ τ′ ′= . The second possibility for the poor class 
candidate is to tax all auto users up to the point at which none of the middle class 
members switch from auto, its status quo, to public transport. We denote such a tax as 
3ˆτ ′′  and it is clear that 3 3ˆ ˆτ τ′′ ′< .  
Formally, if the following condition is satisfied 
 
(13)   1 1 23 2 3 3 3 3 3
2 3 3
ˆ ˆ( ( )) ( ( ))s sv t v t
µ µ µµ µ τ µ τµ µ µ
+′ ′′+ + > ++  
 
thus 
 
(14)   33 1 1 1 2 3ˆ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0f f s st p t pτ σ µ σ µ µ ′′ = − + >  
 
with 1
2 3
3
3ˆ( )s sp p
µ
µ µ τ′ + ′= − . When, instead, (13) does not hold, we have 
(15)   33 2 1 2 2 3ˆ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0f f s st p t pτ σ µ µ σ µ ′′′′ = + − >  
 
with 1 2
3
3
3ˆ( )s sp p
µ µ
µ τ′′ + ′′= − . 
In the framework considered, various equilibria may emerge depending on the 
combination of the optimal policies of the three groups. To discuss what we consider 
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the most relevant cases, it may be convenient to consider two possible scenarios arising 
from the first status quo and one arising from the second status quo. 
 
 
5.1 Case 1: congestion does not hurt much the poor class 
 
Let us first assume that the congestion of public transport is not a big problem for the 
poor. This means that, when possible, they would always prefer to impose a road 
pricing at its maximum level 3ˆτ ′ . This road taxation will be implemented whenever the 
middle class has the same optimal tax policy 2 3ˆ ˆτ τ′ ′= . Clearly, as before, the citizen-
candidate running for office and winning the election will depend on the relative size of 
these two classes. Here, the preferences of the rich are irrelevant. If, instead, the middle 
class finds optimal a zero road pricing (i.e. 2ˆ 0τ ′′ = ), the preferences of the rich become 
important for determining the equilibrium. As long as also the rich does not want a road 
pricing ( 1ˆ 0τ ′′= ), this will be the policy implemented as there are two classes (middle 
class and rich) which prefer it. If the rich would instead prefer a positive road pricing 
( 1ˆ 0τ ′ > ), because the gains from the reduction in the congestion of the road generated by 
the switch of the middle class to public transport more than compensate them for the tax 
paid, then an equilibrium may not necessarily exist.8 
Therefore, when the middle class uses the auto at the status quo, the implementation 
of road pricing requires that the congestion of public transport is not too costly from the 
point of view of the poor and the middle class. It is clear that a positive road pricing is 
more likely to have the support of the population when the possibility of increasing the 
quality (or reducing the price) of public transport through the revenues of road pricing is 
substantial. We can summarize some of the above results with the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. When the road pricing income is entirely redistributed in favor of the 
public mode of transport and at the status quo the middle class uses the road transport, 
the political equilibrium of the citizen-candidate game will imply two cases: 
                                                 
8 This may happen when, in a two-candidate context, there is no group that always wins. 
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(a) For a very low sensitivity of the poor class to congestion, if 
1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )f f s s f f s st p t p t p t pµ σ µ σ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + > − +   
   then * 2 3ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′ ′= = > . 
(b) If, instead 
1 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )f f f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + < + − +   
   and 
1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ),f f s s f f s st p t p t p t pµ σ µ σ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + < − +   
     then * 1 2ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′′ ′′= = = . 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
 
5.2 Case 2: congestion hurts the poor class 
 
Under an alternative scenario, the congestion of public transport can constitute a 
problem for the poor class. Hence, they should prefer a low road pricing (i.e. they prefer 
3ˆτ ′′ ) that is not enough to induce the middle class’ agents to change their mode of 
transport. As we have seen above, the middle class may have two different optimal 
policies. However, if congestion is so costly for the poor that they prefer to give up a 
large redistribution of resources from the private mode to the public one, then it is 
reasonable to expect that the middle class' optimal policy is to use the auto without 
imposing a road pricing ( 2ˆ 0τ ′′ = ). Under these conditions, the policy implemented is no 
road pricing ( 0τ ∗ = ) independently on the preferences of the rich. In fact, if the rich 
prefers no road pricing ( 1ˆ 0τ ′′= ), this policy is optimal for two classes and the winner 
will be a rich or a middle class candidate depending on the relative size of their class. 
When the rich prefers a positive road pricing ( 1ˆ 0τ ′ > ) in order to exclude the middle 
class from the use of the auto, the elected candidate will be the agent of the middle class 
as he will get the votes also of the poor. In fact, the poor prefer (by assumption) no road 
pricing with the middle class using the road to the alternative where public transport is 
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subsidized but it is congested also by the middle class. This is summarized in the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. When the road pricing income is entirely redistributed in favor of 
public transport and at the status quo the middle class uses auto, for a very high 
sensitivity of the poor class to congestion, the political equilibrium of the citizen-
candidate game will imply a zero road pricing. In particular, if: 
 
3 3 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3
1 1 1 1 2 3
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ,
s s f f s s
f f s s
v t v t t p t p
t p t p
µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ
µ σ µ σ µ µ
 − + ≥ − + ≥ 
 ≥ − + 
 
 
then 2ˆ 0.τ τ∗ ′′= =   
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
 
5.3 Case 3: the middle class uses the public transport at the status quo 
 
Finally, we can examine the case in which the middle class uses public transport at the 
status quo. In this case, the poor and the middle class have the same preferences. They 
both want to impose a high taxation on the use of auto since this is used by the rich class 
only (recall that 3 2ˆ ˆτ τ′ ′= ). Therefore, a rich citizen-candidate will never be elected as he 
would be defeated by a middle class or a poor candidate. In equilibrium, the candidate 
running for office will be from the largest class between middle class and poor and the 
road pricing policy implemented will involve a tax rate 2 3ˆ ˆτ τ τ∗ ′ ′= = . The adoption of a 
road pricing scheme in this scenario arises by the desire of the majority of agents (not 
using the auto) to raise revenues in order to improve their mode of transport. 
The insight provided by the latter result is that a positive road pricing is likely to be 
implemented when a large fraction of the population uses alternative modes of transport 
as these individuals have the incentive to tax the use of road in order to improve the 
alternative types of transport. 
The following proposition summarizes this result. It is so easy to grasp that does 
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not require a formal proof. 
 
Proposition 4. When at the status quo the middle class uses public transport, the only 
political equilibrium of the citizen-candidate game will imply * 2 3ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′ ′= = > . 
 
Finally, notice that, in general, many elements appear to be crucial for the result of an 
election. First, the price ratio of transport modes when compared to the speed or quality 
preferences of all three classes. Second, the sensitivity to congestion of the two 
alternative modes of transport, reflecting a number of structural features of the whole 
transport network. Third, the way in which the redistribution of a road pricing is 
assumed to affect people’s wealth. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a simple framework to explain the reasons why road 
pricing schemes are not so diffused around the world. We have focused on the political 
acceptability of such policies using a political economy model where the electoral 
competition takes place with citizen-candidates. We have found that the redistribution 
of resources obtained through road pricing policies towards other modes of transport 
along with less congestion is necessary (even though not sufficient) to make this policy 
acceptable to the majority of the population. The analysis has also highlighted that road 
pricing policies are more likely to be accepted by a winning coalition when the 
redistribution of resources obtained with this form of taxation going to the advantage of 
other modes of transport allows to increase substantially their quality (or, more 
generally, the surplus of the agents that use them) or when at the status quo a large 
fraction of the population does not use the auto. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Rearranging expressions (11) and (12) we can rewrite expression (11) as  
(A1)     1 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )f f f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + > + − +   
which is the condition implying 2ˆ 0τ ′ > . Using instead (9) and (10), we can rewrite (9) as  
(A2) 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ).f f s s f f s st p t p t p t pµ σ µ σ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + > − +   
which is the condition implying 1ˆ 0.τ ′ > Finally, using expressions (13)-(15) we obtain  
(A3) 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( )) ( ( ))f f s s s st p t p v t v tµ σ µ σ µ µ µ µ µ − + > − +   
where (A3) exactly represents the condition implying 3ˆτ ′  0> . Note that for a relatively 
low sensitivity of the poor citizens to congestion, when (A1) holds, also (A3) is 
satisfied. Therefore, when (A1) holds the equilibrium toll is * 2 3ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′ ′= = > . When, 
instead, neither (A1) nor (A2) hold, the equilibrium toll will be * 1 2ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′′ ′′= = = . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  
By rearranging conditions (11)-(12) and (13)-(15) we have that 2ˆ 0τ ′′ =  and 3ˆ 0τ ′′ >  are 
selected for 
2 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )f f s s f f s st p t p t p t pσ µ σ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ   − + ≥ − +     
and  
3 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )s s f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + ≥ − +   
respectively. Note that, whatever the choice of the rich citizen-candidate, the following 
condition  
[ ]3 3 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )s s f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + ≥ − +   
directly implies 
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3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3 1ˆ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) .s s f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ τ ′ − + ≥ + − + =   
The last expression clearly shows that each poor class candidate will prefer to keep 
congestion low in the public transport rather than receiving a positive toll 1ˆτ ′  as 
redistributed income. Therefore, all members of the poor class will vote for the middle 
class candidate, and, again, the political outcome will imply a zero road pricing, 
*
2ˆ 0τ τ ′′= = . 
